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In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,  Kant defines moral autonomy and
heteronomy respectively as follows:
Autonomy of the will is the property (Beschaffenheit) of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of
any property of the objects of volition). […]
If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own giving
of universal law - consequently if, in going beyond itself, it seeks this law in a property of any of its objects -
heteronomy always results1. 
An autonomous moral will is a rational will acting for no reason other than  the sake of  morality,
while a heteronomous one strives to achieve an end through moral action. Kant argues that morality
concerns exclusively the inner motivation of an action and not its outcome; for otherwise it would
be impossible to judge the difference between a person who acts only according to the “letter” of
the law (legally) –  moved by some selfish interest – and a person  who acts also according to the
“spirit” of it (morally).
Through a closer analysis, however, it becomes clear how Kant’s critique of heteronomous
morals rests upon premises which are far from being self-evident2. This becomes apparent when we
attempt  to articulate why he classified  Hutcheson’s theory of moral sentiment as heteronomous.
According to Hutcheson, moral sentiment does not derive from a principle extraneous to morality,
but rather from an inclination towards the good, independent of any reasoning concerning the ends
of the action. God ordered our nature in such a way that our happiness might result from the pursuit
of the ends to which we are immediately inclined. Happiness is the result of moral action, but «the
notion under which one approves virtue, is neither its tendency to obtain any benefit or reward to
the agent or approver [...] [nor] its tendency to procure honour»3. A similar theory may appear as
heteronomous only if one denies that sentiment could have a universal validity.
Kant maintains that happiness derives from the «particular feeling of pleasure and
displeasure» and that it depends on «the differences in needs occasioned by changes of feeling in
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one and the same person». It is therefore clear that, according to Kant, a) happiness (Glückseligkeit)
amounts to the satisfaction of needs, the result of which is pleasure; that is to say, happiness is the
same as well-being (Wohlbefinden)4;  and b)  feeling,  being related to passions,  cannot have any
universal value. These premises align with the basic assumptions of utilitarian thought. Kant rejects
utilitarianism, but, in that he applies a utilitarian understanding of happiness to Hutcheson’s moral
theory, he must also refuse this theory. Kant does not question the idea that individual reason serves
to fulfill human needs and desires,  i.  e.  to find the means to reach clearly defined ends;  he just
denies this reasoning any moral relevance and subordinates it to the imperatives of prudence. Only
the categorical imperative of pure practical reason can constitute morality.
The distinction between the two types of imperatives mirrors a dualistic anthropology,
according to which the subject is divided into a rational (noumenical) and a passional (phenomenal)
sphere5,  the former ruling over the latter.  Yet this leads to the problematic assumption that the
subject who commands morality through the categorical imperative is the same as she who ought to
obey6. It is not clear how a passionate agent should ever be able to give herself a law that she is not
willing to obey,  nor how there could ever be a moral agent if morality is always contrary to the
proper will of the agent7.  Kant himself is willing to acknowledge this problem: «for us human
beings it is quite impossible to explain how and why the universality of a maxim as law and hence
morality interests us»8.  Kant calls this impasse of the reasoning «the extreme boundary of all
practical philosophy», the objective insurmountable limit of human reason itself, such that «all the
pains and labor of seeking an explanation of it are lost». 
To quote a decisive passage: 
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This much only is certain: it is not because the law interests us that it has validity for us (for that is
heteronomy and dependence of practical reason upon sensibility, namely upon a feeling lying at its
basis, in which case it could never be morally lawgiving); instead, the law interests because it is valid
for us as human beings, since it arose from our will as intelligence and so from our proper self9.
This interest, Kant says, is the actual moral sentiment. The law interests us because it provides us
with the image of the sublime autonomy of reason («Duty!  Sublime and mighty name…»10),
namely,  because it arouses our respect.  But this respect cannot be the motive of moral action11,  it
can only be the effect.  When we act according to practical reason,  «the representation of the
superiority of its objective law to the impulses of sensibility is produced […] in the judgment of
reason»12.  The sentiment of respect follows the judgment of reason upon an action,  which in turn
derives directly and inexplicably from the moral law itself. Moral action cannot be grounded in this
sentiment of respect, for as such it would be a heteronomous principle. 
Kant believes that merit is that which we instinctively respect,  namely anything we
recognize as good, such as free, rational, altruistic action. However, he denies that respect could be
the motivation for moral deeds.  As Charles Taylor points out,  freedom, universalism and altruism
are among the strongest moral ideals of modernity,  and they are the starting point of the entire
Kantian reasoning itself.  Yet precisely for the sake of these goods, Kant denies that they are the
source of morals,  and subordinates them to a formal conception of moral law,  whose motivating
force remains inexplicable. For this reason, thinkers in the Kantian tradition, concludes Taylor, «are
constitutionally incapable of coming clean about the deeper sources of their own thinking»13.
A fundamental reason for which Kantians deny  that substantial  ideas of good may play a
role in moral action certainly derives from the epistemological claim that natural sciences provide
the only trustworthy objective model of inquiry. Considerations about the good or related feelings
are  viewed as subjective or at least culture-dependent. A notion of the good –  according to this
argument – could claim universal  validity only by basing itself on a metaphysical, teleological
account of human nature, which modern science has discredited. Such considerations cannot figure
in a neutral account of reality, however important they may appear to the subject. 
The strongest moral reason for rejecting any notion of the good,  however,  is the modern
understanding of freedom.  Anything that is good independently of human autonomous reason
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seems to stand as an external authority limiting the freedom of the subject. An authentic moral order
ought to be defined by the subject, not by nature14. 
For all these motives Kant excludes that morality could depend on a conception of the good.
However, we must now ask: would it have really been sufficient to allow a notion of the good to
explain why humans act morally? If we take the sentiment of respect as the starting point, we do not
really solve the problem, we just displace it. It seems that we must face an inescapable alternative:
either we start from the moral law as an inexplicable «fact of reason»15 or we start from a no less
inexplicable sentiment of what is good. At first glance it seems quite obvious to choose the former.
True, the fact of reason cannot be explained, but nevertheless one can demonstrate that moral action
ought to accord to the law. Moreover, one can explain how the sentiment of respect arises from the
majesty of reason. If one begins with the “fact of the sentiment of respect”, it is impossible to give
an account of any of these aspects, and we are driven to irrationality. 
For this reason, Hutcheson’s theory of moral sentiment could be sustained only by a faith in
a providential God who ordered the nature of humans, instilling in it a sentiment as the source of
moral  obligation.  Once  Kant’s  radical  critique  of  metaphysics  has  ruled  out  the  possibility  of
founding morals upon the concept of God – since theoretical reason cannot state anything about its
existence, let alone about the characteristics of its perfection – moral sentiment is deprived of any
definite  grounding, and  can no longer  provide any guidance. It  is exposed to illusion, just as the
reflecting  subject  of  Descartes’  Meditations could  be  misled,  despite  his  certainty,  by  an  evil
demon.
Since  Kant’s  philosophy  has  inspired a  lasting  tradition  of  thought  which  –  as  Taylor
demonstrated – never really succeeded in solving the problem of the source of moral obligation, we
must ask if there is a way of grounding morality in sentiment which escapes Hutcheson’s need for a
theological foundation. Such a theory should be able to explain both the genesis and the universal
validity of moral sentiment. 
Before  we  proceed, a  conceptual  clarification  is  necessary.  What  kind  of  linkage  exists
between moral sentiment and the good? Both Hutcheson and Kant maintain that moral sentiment is
linked  to  the  virtuous  and  the  praiseworthy,  i.  e.  with  something  that  is  recognized  as  good.
However,  for Kant  this sentiment  is derived from a spontaneous16 judgment of practical  reason,
which  recognizes that action is compliant with moral law. For Hutcheson, on the other hand,  the
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sentiment immediately  recognizes  the  good,  without  the  mediation  of  any  kind  of  intellectual
reasoning. Since we are trying to follow Hutcheson’s path, let us assume that the good is recognized
as such without any reflection. Nevertheless, since we refuse his theological presuppositions, we
should introduce another concept, namely that of “values”. We appeal to values  when we try to
articulate our moral experience, to explain what makes something good (at least for us)17.
The concept of “value”, as Hans Joas points out18, gradually took the place of that of “good”.
While the latter used to refer to a metaphysical  unity of truth and good, ascertainable either by
rational contemplation of the cosmos or through divine revelation, the former refers to the subject,
whose value-feelings are the basis of moral judgment. The German philosophy of values of the 19th
century, however, still strove to assign to values an objective and universal meaning, without taking
into serious consideration their historical contingency. This is of course an aspect we can no longer
ignore, for to ignore it would be to ignore the entire history of philosophy of the following century.
The question about the genesis of moral sentiment therefore becomes a question about the genesis
of values.
Nietzsche was the first to address  this matter. In his work  On the Genealogy of Morality,
values  as  altruism,  reciprocal  love,  egalitarianism,  and democracy are  traced  back  to  repressed
sentiments of hate and revenge. What we usually consider to be moral values actually derives from
«the ressentiment of beings denied the true reaction, that of the deed, who recover their losses only
through an imaginary revenge»19. Yet, far from being a convincing answer about the genesis of
values based on a scientific historical or philological inquiry (provided that this was his actual aim),
this fundamental thesis is much more the result of a philosophical  speculation about the value of
values  themselves.  While  in  the  Genealogy  –  which  is  A polemic  –  he  seems  to  provide  his
definitive answer to this question, radically denying any value to traditional ethics, one can find a
more cautious answer in his other works. In a famous passage from The Gay Science he questions
the immediacy of what we have called moral sentiment, namely of our “conscience”:
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Why do you take this and specifically this to be right? 'Because my conscience tells me so; conscience
never speaks immorally, since it determines what is to count as moral! 'But why do you listen to the
words  of your  conscience?  And  what  gives  you the  right  to  consider  such a  judgement  true  and
infallible?  For  this  belief  –  is  there  no  conscience?  Do  you  know  nothing  of  an  intellectual
conscience? A conscience behind your 'conscience'? Your judgement, 'that is right' has a prehistory in
your drives, inclinations, aversions, experiences, and what you have failed to experience; you have to
ask, 'how did it emerge there?' and then also, 'what is really impelling me to listen to it?'20
If the reader remembers the terminological distinctions I have introduced, it can be said that in this
passage Nietzsche is asking us nothing more than to articulate our moral sentiment, recognizing
what kind of values ground our judgments and how these values came about. Yet the genesis itself
tells us nothing about the truth of values: «a morality could even have grown out of an error, and the
realization of this fact would not as much as touch the problem of its value»21. What is important
about  the  genesis  of  values  is  that  acknowledging  it  helps  us  to  understand  whether  what  we
understand as good is really good for us, or, on the contrary, if it is just an unquestioned inheritance
of some external influence. The passage quoted above continues as follows: 
You can listen to its  commands [i.  e.  to the commands of conscience]  like  a good soldier who  heeds the
command of his officer. Or like a woman who  loves the one who commands. Or like a flatterer and coward
who fears the commander. Or like a fool who obeys because he can think of no objection. In short, there are a
hundred ways to listen to your conscience22. 
In other words,  you can judge and act according to morality because this is what society expects
from you, or because you fear a punishment. But your morality can also be the fruit of love for your
fellow human beings who command your respect, and so on. How these motives result in actions is
«unprovable», because «as one observes or recollects any action, it is and remains impenetrable»23.
It is therefore also unprovable that altruistic action necessarily derives from a tacit ressentiment.
What justifies Nietzsche’s interpretation is a radical pessimistic view of the meaning of life as a
self-affirmative will to power without a proper scope, which leads him to embrace a strong ideal:
«the ideal of the most high-spirited,  vital,  world affirming individual,  who has learned not just to
accept and go along with what is, but who wants it again just as it was and is through all eternity»24.
In contrast, the “Christian” moral ideal is contrary to life and therefore subhuman and anti-nature. It
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cannot but derive from «a declining,  weakened,  exhausted,  condemned life»25.  Yet,  it cannot be
stated whether or not this idea of life is justified. 
Even to raise the problem of the value of life, you would need to be both outside life and as familiar with life
as someone, anyone, everyone who has ever lived: this is enough to tell us that the problem is inaccessible to
us26. 
Behind opposing forms of morals there are different conceptions of life,  upon the value of which
only faith can decide. There can be no decisive argument.
Virtue gives happiness and a type of blessedness only to those who have not lost faith in their virtue - not to
those subtler souls whose virtue consists of a deep mistrust of themselves and of all virtue. So in the end, here,
too, 'faith makes blessed' - and, mind you, not virtue!27 
Once  the  genealogist  has  uncovered  the  genesis  of  values,  he  cannot  decide  upon  their  truth.
However, Nietzsche’s genealogy is far from being neutral, because he describes the opposing view
starting  from  his  own  ideal.  It  was  quite  simple  for  Max  Scheler  to  show  how  Nietzsche
misunderstood the Christian idea of love. Such an overwhelming and empowering force cannot be
the expression of a  weak character.  As Scheler  pointed out,  Nietzsche interprets  religion as an
ideological  justification for a restrictive morality,  rather  than grasping the nature of religion as
such28.  The  distinction  between  morality  and  religion  is  central  to  William  James’  book  The
Varieties of Religious Experience. Whereas the moral law, since it mortifies our passions, is a yoke
to be sustained, even if reluctantly (as Kant says29), «the service of the highest never is felt as a
yoke»30. While the moral law «must […] produce a feeling that can be called pain»31, the religious
sentiment is accompanied by «a  mood of welcome, which may fill  any place between cheerful
serenity and enthusiastic gladness»32. Between morality and religion, says James, «the difference is
as great as that between passivity and activity,  as that between the defensive and the  aggressive
mood»33. 
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Nietzsche’s critique could therefore apply to Kant, but not to Christianity34. He could not
understand what kind of blessedness derives from a religious experience because he never had such
an experience. On the contrary, exactly this is the starting point of James’ inquiry. First of all, this
experience consists of a feeling of being in relation with a higher being, which can be – but is not
necessarily – identified with a personal God. Secondly,  this feeling results in an utterly positive
attitude toward the universe. While the moral acceptance of the universe requires strict discipline, in
the case of religion «no exertion of volition is required»35. The universe is accepted with a joyful
and peaceful soul.
This  also  means  that  a  religious  belief  cannot  be  chosen.  To  some  people  a  religious
experience may be, temporarily or permanently, precluded. Such ineptitude for religious faith may
be intellectual in its origins, as deriving from «pessimistic and materialistic beliefs», or from «the
agnostic  vetoes  upon faith  as  something  weak  and  shameful».  But  some people  may even  be
«spiritually barren» and, even if they «admire and envy faith in others», they «can never encompass
the enthusiasm and peace which those who are temperamentally qualified for faith enjoy»36. Just as
faith cannot be shattered by rational discourses, «we cannot create a belief out of whole cloth when
our  perception  actively  assures  us  of  its  opposite»37.  One  can  interpret  this  fact  either  in  a
theological way, affirming that faith is a gift of God’s grace, or in a psychological way. Yet the one
does not  exclude the other.  The  origin  of  a  sentiment,  as  already stated by Nietzsche,  is  quite
indifferent in regard to its significance.
James  inquires  how  this  state  of  blessedness  originates  in  experiences,  quoting
autobiographical  writings  and  letters  of  saints  and  common  people  who  underwent these
experiences in  their  most  extreme  forms.  Sudden  conversions,  mystical  ecstasies,  prayers
(generically understood as an inward sense of partaking in a higher force) are the case-studies of his
book.  All  these  experiences  can  be  labeled  under  what  Joas  calls  «experiences  of  self-
transcendence»38. They are all characterized by subjective self-evidence and affective intensity: the
subject  feels  seized  (ergriffen)  by  a  force  which  transcends  her,  in  the  sense  that  it  exceeds
(übersteigt) her will, although it is not necessarily understood as coming from another world39.
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In examining religious experiences, both Émile Durkheim and John Dewey deny them any
supernatural meaning. They maintain that the feeling of being conquered by such a transcendent
force explains but does not justify religious interpretations. As Dewey puts it, «it is not a religion
that brings it about, but when it occurs, from whatever cause and by whatever means, there is a
religious outlook and function»40. The actual origin of this feeling is individuated by both thinkers
in social  phenomena.  While Durkheim attributes  it  to  experiences  of  collective ecstasy,  Dewey
attributes  the  genesis  of  ideals  to  the  intersubjective  dimension  of  human  nature.  Through
communication a human can open herself to another (understood as God by religion) and let herself
be shaken in order to realize  herself with and through  the  other41. In his analysis, Dewey makes
clear that experiences of self-transcendence are always also experiences of «self-formation», insofar
as ideals are constitutive of the image of a «whole self», which the subject strives to realize42. 
That there exists a linkage between values and self-formation is a central thesis in Charles
Taylor’s Sources of the Self, from which I have already quoted. As he points out, in answering the
question “who am I?” we cannot but declare what is valuable for us. If we answer, for example, “I
am a Christian”,  or “I am an Italian”,  or even “I am an anarchist”,  we are expressing our
commitment to something we strongly feel as valuable (say,  respectively, God’s love,  democratic
Republic, mutual aid). A neutral self-description would have no meaning for us43.
Despite the undeniable social character of values, namely the fact that there cannot be values
experienced only by an  individual44,  our  sentiments are  always  individual.  However  much one
empathizes with another – to express it in the words of Merleau-Ponty – «it is nevertheless from the
background of his own subjectivity that each projects this “single” world»45. Our communication
terminates in the paradox of «a solipsism-shared-by-many»46. If this is true, then our personal value-
experiences  cannot  be  inquired  from the  outside,  by someone  to  whom they are  precluded.  It
follows that genealogy can only be an endless process of self-revising of one’s own unreflective
judgments. It may have either a biographical or an historical dimension. 
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The biographical dimension aims to find a place for our moral values in our individual self-
understanding. As Taylor says, we are «moved» from our values47, and in this very experience we
sense that  what moves us is  infinitely valuable,  that  it  could not derive from our  ressentiment.
However,  to  prove  our  own  values,  we  must  face  the  critique  and  ask  ourselves  Nietzsche’s
question: «why do you listen to the words of your conscience?». If the genealogical articulation of
our moral beliefs does not shatter our adherence to them, our feeling of commitment to them cannot
but be strengthened by it. But we can also be forced to recognize our hypocrisy, which in turn can
make us either strive to adhere to our values with a more radical coherence, or to recognize them as
false. In the latter case, we must bring about a «transvaluation»48 of our values, i. e. to recognize a
higher good hitherto unknown, which better suits our moral experience and self-understanding. 
This genealogical self-revising is, of course, not a process that takes place in the solitary
conscience of the individual. It always entails a dialogical dimension. That is why we can never
reach a definitive certainty about our beliefs. We are steadily confronted by alternative worldviews
and lifestyles that ask us to justify our choices49. Moreover, in the articulation of our  beliefs we
cannot but resort to the shared language through which they have been formulated by our traditions.
Our social framework is imbued with qualitative distinctions that influence our moral stance50. This
does not mean that we are compelled to internalize values from which we cannot take any critical
distance. Yet they must be our starting point, for we cannot create a new language ex nihilo. New
formulations  can only  arise in  contrast to older  ones,  and may have  their  source  in alternative
present traditions. 
This argument indicates  that  the biographical  and social  dimensions of values cannot be
completely separated. However, historical genealogical inquiry has its own peculiarities, concerning
primarily  our  collective  values  and  cultural  identity.  According  to  Joas,  who  (drawing  on
Troeltsch’s historicism) developed  historical genealogy methodologically,  this inquiry  must start
from the «fact of ideal formation»51. In contrast to Kant’s «fact of reason», or any “fact of moral
sentiment”, which turned out to be inexplicable, the fact of ideal formation refers to the contingent
genesis of values through particular experiences in specific historical circumstances, which are the
object of inquiry. 
47
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Even if the ideal has survived the contingent historical context of its genesis, it cannot be
evaluated in abstraction from these conditions. We  must understand how individuals, collectives
and institutions of that historical moment were moved from the emerging ideal. Only in this way
can we give an account of the creative element of human action in history which initiates change. In
other words, historical inquiry must strive to understand «the specific individuality of historical
phenomena»52. Each ideal has its own history, which interacts with that of the others. Rather than as
a  linear  process,  history  must  be  understood  as  the  interplay  of  different  totalities,  whose
development exhibit an approaching to (or a distancing from) the respective grounding ideals53.
In striving to understand values in their historical context and development, the historian
must put into play her own present understanding of them. This is not a scientific deficit, but the
very condition of the analytical enterprise. In fact, «we experience values as a demand made of us,
or not [at all]»54. Should the object of inquiry not provoke the historian’s stance on the matter, it
would be of no interest, and it would not become an object of inquiry. On the contrary, if the values
of the past do arouse the historian’s attention, «then this call goes way beyond research, affecting
our present, future-directed action»55.  In  this case, we «incorporate historically originating ideals
into our action and attempt to realize them beyond their historical manifestations»56. The ideology
of progress is therefore replaced by a «teleology of the will that molds and shapes its past into the
future out of the present»57. 
Joas calls this method «affirmative genealogy»58. It is genealogical insofar as it refuses any
objective teleology and any alleged naturality of the good.  It does not seek an ultimate rational
justification of values;  instead,  uncovering their genesis,  it reveals the significance that they have
had and may have for us today.  In this regard,  Joas’  genealogy differs from Nietzsche’s,  whose
chief goal was demystification. Joas’ method is affirmative, for it aims at a clarification, instead of a
deconstruction,  of the value of values,  in order to provide historical grounds for the subjective
evidence that characterizes the present experience of them.
52
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However,  affirmative genealogy also has a negative,  i.  e.  critical side.  First,  genealogy as
such deconstrues any ideological interpretation of historical development. Second, it casts light on
the complexity of each value’s history, on the contribution of different traditions of thought to their
articulation, and in so doing it carries out a critical function toward any praxis which distances itself
from the most profound meaning of the values, and that can be justified only by a narrow
interpretation of them59.
The biographical and the historical genealogy have different functions. It is not only, as I
have said, that the first concerns more directly the individual and the second the collective sphere.
They uncover different kinds of reasons for judging something as valuable. On the historical level
one may believe to have proved that a value – to use Nietzsche’s words – grew «out of an error, and
the realization of this fact would not as much as touch the problem of its value». This is because our
commitment to our values is the result of a sentiment that is rooted in a deeper level than that of
rational discourse; «something in you absolutely knows that that result must be truer than any logic-
chopping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it»60. This is actually the meaning of
religious faith, which as  such cannot be shattered by worldly reasons, but  this is true of all our
deepest beliefs. For example, an historic-genealogical inquiry could make one cease to believe in
religious goods – it happens, according to James, «when our inarticulate feelings of reality have
already  been  impressed  in  favor  of  the  same  conclusion»61 –  and  yet  not  shatter  the  personal
adherence to the moral values which are attached to them. Imagine a former catholic who no longer
recognizes her faith, but still has a strong belief in mutual love, for she experienced its value during
her life. The historical dimension of genealogical inquiry always makes us aware of the radical
contingency of our values, while biographical narration can open us to the universal validity of our
beliefs. 
A third difference between the historical and the biographical genealogy is that only the
latter is accessible to everyone. It goes without saying that historical inquiry is a matter of studies
and that even their most widespread outcomes are unknown to people who do not have access to
higher education. However, even if the historical dimension may provide more compelling reasons
(be they positive or negative) than the biographical, we have just seen how the latter is in the last
instance independent from the former.
59
 Cf. Joas (2015).
60
 James (2012), p. 63; Cf. Joas (2001) and Joas (2008).
61
 Ibid.
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Thus,  while the biographical is of the greatest relevance for individual beliefs,  the final
difference between the two is that the historical carries a greater importance for the public sphere.
The critical function of affirmative genealogy is fundamental for a positive communication about
values between different religious and philosophical traditions.  If we are to share our «identity
space» – namely to find «a commonly acceptable, even compromised political identity between the
different personal or group identities which want to/have to live in the polity»62 – we must find a
way to agree upon certain fundamental values.  In other words,  our particular values must be
generalized. The concept of «value generalization» was coined by Talcott Parsons, but is applied by
Joas to a wider spectrum of phenomena. It can be defined with Parsons’  words as «the inclusion,
under a single legitimizing value-pattern,  of components which are not only diverse and
differentiated from each other,  but many of which have,  historically,  claimed some sort of an
‘absolutistic’  monopoly of moral legitimacy»63.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a
valid example of this process,  insofar as representatives of different traditions succeeded in
acknowledging the value of human rights,  explicitly renouncing a discourse about their
philosophical or religious grounding.
Since value-commitments are rooted in experiences which are inseparable from the forms
they  have taken  throughout  history,  they are definitely culture-specific.  Each culture cannot but
refer  to  its  own  particular  understanding  of  what  makes  a  value  valuable.  To  use  Taylor’s
expression, each culture refers to incompatible «moral sources»64. We cannot learn what is good, as
Kant maintained, by means of pure practical  reason; we  learn  it  rather  through  our  inescapable
cultural framework. However, this does not mean that our conceptions of the good cannot have any
universal value.
Both Nietzsche and James would agree in stating that what is true is that which has positive
effects on life. Of course, Nietzsche explicitly denies any meaning to the very concept of truth. Yet
if we call “true” what has positive effects on life, it follows that what we understand as true depends
on our conception of life. Since Nietzsche’s concept of life is that of an irrational self-affirming
force65,  he  cannot  but  reject  the  traditional  understanding  of  truth.  What  is  true  becomes  any
affirmation of life itself, which therefore cannot be universal. The truth of the statement that there is
no  truth:  this  is  the  well-known  paradox  of  any  nihilistic  philosophy,  which  cannot  be  easily
62
 Taylor (2011), p. 144.
63
 Quoted from Comparative Studies and Evolutionary Change in Joas (2008), p. 93 and Joas (2013), p. 179
64
 Taylor (1989), pp. 91 and following.
65
 Nietzsche’s concept of life can be elevated, says Joas, «to the status of a post-religious myth» (1996), p. 125.
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discredited by means of a logical  criticism66,  but  has to be faced in  its  radical  and challenging
meaning.
On  the  contrary,  if  we  understand  life  as  a  biological  fact  that  does  not  justify  any
supremacy of one over another, and whose value is the same with regard to every person, we could
accept as true that which makes a potentially universal, positive, practical difference, provided that
it is not proved absurd by any other statement67. The only way to prove that our values are not
absurd  (which  is  our  second  truth  condition)  is  to  undergo  the genealogical process  of
intersubjective  self-revising  which  I  have  described.  Their  truth  must  be  understood  as  the
(provisional) result of such an inquiry, until some experience will, if ever, force us to abandon them
in favor of higher goods. The first truth condition is their having a potentially universal, positive,
practical  difference.  Introducing  the  clause  “potentially  universal”,  I  aim to  escape  the  risk  of
subjectivism that characterizes James’ theory of truth by recalling a Kantian principle. Our value
orientations must pass through the «sieve of the norm»68, i. e. they must be universalizable in the
Kantian sense. They must be suitable for a «kingdom of ends». On the other hand, the pragmatic
principle  allows us  to  avoid  the  abstraction of  the  categorical  imperative,  which,  as  Alasdair
MacIntyre pointed out, also allows immoral and trivial maxims69: our values must make a positive
practical difference. 
Now, if we link these two principles, we see that this practical difference, in order to be
positive, must be in principle universally acceptable. Let us take as an example the Christian idea of
love. It is of course not a universal value, for the simple reason that not everyone is a Christian. Yet
it can be potentially universal, insofar as the practical differences that derive from it are valued as
good by anyone involved, even if they may provide an utterly different interpretation of its value.
This is far from obvious, since love can easily degenerate into a degrading solicitude, which denies
the other’s dignity and freedom70. Our values can be proved as true only if the practical difference
they make is recognized as positive by all who are concerned. If it is so, it will be possible to find
an agreement upon a formulation of that value, which, avoiding any culture-specific vocabulary,
will be generalized.
66
 Needless to recall how Nietzsche would respond to such a critique, cf. Nietzsche (2002), p. 23.
67
 If life is valuable as the life of persons, it follows, as Scheler shows, that the value of life itself has to be subordinated
to the spiritual values of the person, which cannot be biologically justified. Cf. Scheler (1973), pp. 288 and following.
The “practical difference” of truth must therefore not be related to the mere self-preservation of the individual,  but
instead to the whole personality.
68
 Ricoeur (1992), p. 170. Cf. Joas (2000), p. 172.
69
 MacIntyre (2007), pp. 45-46.
70
 Cf. Heidegger (2005), § 26; Ricoeur (1992), pp. 218 and following; Taylor (1989), p. 516.
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However, we must admit that this discourse is based on a postulate, namely that universal
consensus is better than imposition and violence. An ultimate rational foundation for our values is
impossible, if we take Nietzsche’s challenge seriously. His critique, however, does not prove the
falsity of our assumption. The last word must be left to our faith in the universal  value of the
person.  Fortunately,  this  value  is  largely  shared,  even  though  different  cultures  articulate  it
differently and often limit it to a particular group of individuals, to whom the status of “person” is
reserved. Even the most violent oppression is hardly justified by denying this value, but rather by
appealing to political and religious principles, to which priority is accorded in specific situations.
Nietzsche’s  conception  of  life,  then,  does  not  mirror  the  most  widespread  moral  intuitions.
According  to  Taylor,  every individual,  as  an anthropological  constant,  instinctively reacts  with
approval to behaviours that foster the respect of those to whom the status of person is accorded, and
with disapproval to behaviours that deny it. However much this statement may be exaggerated, it
expresses a deep moral intuition which is present in those individuals who are not perverted by
violence71. 
 To sum up the responses provided in this paper to the question about the genesis and the
validity of our motives for moral action: firstly, the “heteronomous” principle of moral sentiment –
understood as the subjective evidence that accompanies the feeling that something is valuable –
better  explains  our  moral  experience  then  Kantian  moral  rationalism;  secondly,  values  arise  in
social contexts through experiences of self-transcendence and self-formation (which is the central
thesis  of  Joas’  book  The Genesis  of  Values);  thirdly,  any ultimate rational  foundation of  these
values is impossible and must be substituted by genealogical narration; finally, values can be held
true if they make a potentially universal, positive, practical difference, provided that they are not
proved absurd by any other statement. 
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